ship
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on external CLI tools to perform its tasks. It uses
gh issue createto manage GitHub issues andcodex execto execute code and prompts autonomously. Thecodex execcommand is used with the--sandbox workspace-writeflag, allowing it to modify the local filesystem based on model output. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted user data (e.g., task 'braindumps' or feature requests) and interpolates them directly into templates for GitHub issues and prompts for sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: User tasks are processed in
SKILL.md(Gate 0 and Gate 2) andreferences/issue-standard.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a markdown template for issues but lacks explicit instructions to the implementer model to ignore embedded malicious instructions in the task description.
- Capability inventory: The agent can write to the filesystem via
codex, create GitHub issues viagh, and spawn sub-agents. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the user's input is performed before it is passed to downstream tools or models.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references an installation command using
npxto fetch the skill from the author's own repository (thatjuan/agent-skills). This is standard behavior for the skill's distribution model.
Audit Metadata