content-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-supplied topics and local file contents as inputs for sequential subagents (research-analyst, editor-in-chief, social-amplifier). Maliciously crafted content within these inputs could potentially influence the behavior of the subagents.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts a
[topic or file path]as input for the orchestration pipeline inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters (like XML tags or triple quotes) or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are defined in the agent spawning instructions in
REFERENCE.md. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to spawn new agents and write output files to the local file system (e.g.,
./research-briefs/,./content/). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization, validation, or filtering applied to the external input before it is interpolated into the prompts for the subagents.
Audit Metadata