google-tag-manager

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze Google Tag Manager container exports in JSON format. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface where a malicious actor could embed instructions within tag names or triggers in a container to influence the agent's audit report.
  • Ingestion points: Processes GTM container JSON exports provided by the user (SKILL.md, EXAMPLES.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the untrusted container data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is primarily instructional but mentions a related gtm-implementer agent for writing changes via API.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation of the input JSON structure or content is described.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download its source code and other marketing skills from a remote repository.
  • Evidence: git clone https://github.com/thatrebeccarae/claude-marketing.git (SKILL.md).
  • Context: The repository belongs to the skill's author, representing a legitimate vendor resource.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill includes futuristic dates in its metadata and reference materials which could be misleading.
  • Evidence: updated: 2026-03-18 in SKILL.md and references to TCF v2.3 compliance as of February 2026 in REFERENCE.md.
  • Context: While likely a stylistic choice or error, inaccurate metadata is technically deceptive.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 07:26 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — google-tag-manager