repo-scaffold
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes local file names and contents to determine project types and populate templates, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection from potentially untrusted project data.
- Ingestion points: Reads directory structure and file contents (e.g.,
package.json,pyproject.toml) duringStep 2andStep 3to detect project markers. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are mentioned for processing file content, but
Step 5provides a human-in-the-loop confirmation step before any file writes occur. - Capability inventory: The skill has file-writing capabilities across the local repository in
Step 6. - Sanitization: The skill does not specify sanitization for ingested data before using it to select templates or fill variables.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The generated CI templates include references to official GitHub Actions and established community tools.
- Evidence:
REFERENCE.mdcontains templates referencingactions/checkout@v4,actions/setup-node@v4,actions/setup-python@v5,actions/setup-go@v5,dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable, andgolangci/golangci-lint-action@v6. These are well-known and trusted services used for standard development workflows. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell command to retrieve the user's identity for license attribution.
- Evidence:
Step 4ainSKILL.mdspecifies runninggit config user.nameto populate the license holder field.
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