defuddle

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions advise the installation of the defuddle package globally via NPM (npm install -g defuddle). This introduces a dependency on an external package from a source not recognized as a trusted vendor.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the defuddle CLI to parse web content. The usage pattern defuddle parse <url> directly interpolates a URL into a shell command. If the AI agent passes unvalidated user input into this command, it could lead to shell command injection (e.g., <url> containing shell operators like ;, &&, or ||).\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and summarize content from external web pages, which is a significant surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
  • Ingestion points: Web content is fetched and converted to markdown via defuddle parse <url> (SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or directives for the agent to ignore instructions contained within the extracted content.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands via the defuddle CLI and potentially other tools available in the environment.\n
  • Sanitization: There are no specified sanitization or filtering steps to ensure that malicious instructions within the parsed web content do not influence the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 10, 2026, 01:27 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — defuddle