meeting-assistant
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process unstructured text from meeting transcripts, notes, and external research findings, which serves as an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Meeting notes provided through user prompts and external research findings integrated via the 'research-assistant' chain described in 'references/advanced-patterns.md'.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing external meeting content, which could allow embedded commands in a transcript to influence agent behavior.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to perform filesystem operations, specifically creating and updating files within the 'meetings/' directory (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the external content before it is interpolated into the agent's context or written to local files.
Audit Metadata