cursor-control-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a workflow where the agent ingests data from external CLI processes, which constitutes a vulnerability surface for instructions embedded in tool output.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to use
tmux capture-pane -ptandos.read(master_fd, 4096)inSKILL.mdto monitor the state of the terminal. - Boundary markers: The provided templates do not include explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" markers when reading terminal buffers.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
subprocess.Popen,tmux send-keys, andos.writeto interact with the system, providing a mechanism for an injected instruction to trigger follow-up actions. - Sanitization: The skill includes a "Guardrails" section that explicitly warns against sending credentials or destructive commands, which acts as a manual safety check but does not programmatically sanitize the input.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides templates for generating and executing temporary Python and Bash scripts at runtime to manage PTY (Pseudo-Terminal) sessions.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains code blocks for a "Minimal PTY Harness" using Python'sptyandsubprocessmodules, and a "Minimal tmux Harness" using shell scripting. - Severity Context: This is classified as simple script generation from known templates for legitimate automation purposes, but it involves the runtime creation of executable logic.
Audit Metadata