cursor-control-cli

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a workflow where the agent ingests data from external CLI processes, which constitutes a vulnerability surface for instructions embedded in tool output.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to use tmux capture-pane -pt and os.read(master_fd, 4096) in SKILL.md to monitor the state of the terminal.
  • Boundary markers: The provided templates do not include explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" markers when reading terminal buffers.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses subprocess.Popen, tmux send-keys, and os.write to interact with the system, providing a mechanism for an injected instruction to trigger follow-up actions.
  • Sanitization: The skill includes a "Guardrails" section that explicitly warns against sending credentials or destructive commands, which acts as a manual safety check but does not programmatically sanitize the input.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides templates for generating and executing temporary Python and Bash scripts at runtime to manage PTY (Pseudo-Terminal) sessions.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains code blocks for a "Minimal PTY Harness" using Python's pty and subprocess modules, and a "Minimal tmux Harness" using shell scripting.
  • Severity Context: This is classified as simple script generation from known templates for legitimate automation purposes, but it involves the runtime creation of executable logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 12:15 PM