cursor-cursor-sdk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-supplied prompt text to generate migration plans for Codex operations.
- Ingestion points: The
promptfield within the JSON object passed toscripts/cursor_sdk_native_adapter.py. - Boundary markers: The script enforces a strict 16,000-character limit and performs validation to ensure the input is non-empty text without control characters.
- Capability inventory: The ingested prompt is passed as an argument to downstream "native Codex" tool calls (
create_thread,send_message_to_thread). - Sanitization: The
_require_textfunction filters non-printable characters and enforces length limits to reduce the surface area for adversarial input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The adapter includes proactive measures to prevent the exposure of sensitive credentials and API keys.
- Credential Scrubbing: The script uses a
_sensitive_pathsfunction to recursively scan requests and results for keys likeapikey,token, andpassword. - Fail-Closed Logic: If sensitive keys are detected in the request or if a bridge returns sensitive data, the script terminates with a
FAIL_CLOSEDstatus. - Exception Hiding: The script intentionally suppresses detailed error messages from the native bridge to prevent the leakage of internal paths or environment details.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the execution of a Python-based migration adapter to translate SDK requests.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to executepython3 scripts/cursor_sdk_native_adapter.py planto process requests.
Audit Metadata