cursor-cursor-team-kit-pr-review-canvas
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands via the GitHub CLI (
gh) to fetch pull request metadata, file patches, and discussion comments. It also usespython3 -m http.serverto start a local web server on127.0.0.1to serve the generated review page. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: A Python script is executed via a heredoc in the assembly phase to read temporary files from
/tmp, perform string replacements (injecting CSS, JS, and HTML body), and write the final HTML file. This script includes basic character escaping to prevent JSON data from breaking HTML script tags. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub (PR bodies and comments) which could contain malicious instructions or XSS payloads meant to trigger when the reviewer opens the generated walkthrough.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved from
gh apicalls as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to distinguish between PR data and control instructions during the HTML body generation.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses (
gh,python3) and write files to the/tmpdirectory. - Sanitization: The
renderer.jsfile includes a basicesc()function for diff content, and the Python assembly script uses character substitution for JSON embedding, but the primary HTML body generated by the agent is not strictly sanitized.
Audit Metadata