cursor-how
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from an external codebase to answer architectural questions, which introduces an attack surface for instructions embedded in code comments or documentation.
- Ingestion points: The skill interpolates the user question into subagent prompts and ingests codebase content via ripgrep and file read tools, as defined in
references/explorer-prompt.mdandreferences/explainer-prompt.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates use markdown headers and blockquotes to delimit the user question and explorer findings.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes filesystem search and read capabilities (
rg,file reads) and can spawn subagents through a model capability router. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or content filtering for data retrieved from the codebase before it is passed to the explainer agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill metadata in
MIRROR.mdidentifies the source of the skill as the Cursor plugins repository on GitHub. - Evidence:
https://github.com/cursor/plugins.gitreferenced in the mirror metadata. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The exploration instructions direct the agent to utilize command-line search tools to identify symbols and code patterns within the project.
- Evidence: The
references/explorer-prompt.mdfile instructs the agent to userg --files,rg, and file read tools to locate directories and implementations.
Audit Metadata