cursor-pr-review-canvas-pr-review-canvas
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill instructions direct the agent to access files located in
~/.cursor/, specifically~/.cursor/skills-cursor/canvas/SKILL.mdand SDK definitions in~/.cursor/skills-cursor/canvas/sdk/. These paths are sensitive as they reside within the user's home directory and contain application configuration and metadata. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions specify the use of the
gh pr diffcommand to fetch data from GitHub. This involves executing an external process and performing network operations based on user-supplied PR identifiers. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, creating a potential injection vector.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested from GitHub PR diffs (via
gh) and chat transcript files (processed byscripts/cursor_canvas_adapters.py). - Boundary markers: The skill generates Markdown and HTML artifacts based on these inputs but does not consistently apply explicit boundary markers or warnings to prevent downstream agents from executing instructions embedded in the diffs or transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes command execution (
ghinSKILL.md) and file system writes (path.write_textinscripts/cursor_canvas_adapters.py) to the.artifacts/directory. - Sanitization: The
scripts/cursor_canvas_adapters.pyfile contains an_redact_preference_textfunction that uses regular expressions to detect and redact potential secrets (API keys, access tokens, passwords) and private identifiers (paths, emails) before including them in generated artifacts. It also includes URL validation via_safe_hrefto ensure links use safe protocols.
Audit Metadata