cursor-swarm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [SAFE]: No malicious instructions, obfuscation, or unauthorized network operations were detected. The agent configuration in
agents/openai.yamlexplicitly disables implicit invocation, which is a defensive measure to ensure the skill is only used when intended. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes outputs from external sub-agents during its aggregation phase, which represents a potential injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Phase C (Aggregate) involves reading terminal results from parallel worker sub-agents.
- Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly command the agent to "not paste raw worker dumps," providing a clear instruction to avoid direct ingestion of untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill manages the spawning and results-processing of multiple native workers to handle code slices or race arms.
- Sanitization: The instructions require the agent to generate a "compact result table" and "one-line evidenced issues," effectively acting as a summarization and filtering layer that prevents raw payloads from being interpreted as instructions by the parent agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
MIRROR.mdfile provides provenance links to the officialcursor/pluginsGitHub repository. This documentation allows for source verification and does not involve the runtime execution of remote code.
Audit Metadata