cursor-why
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process a wide variety of untrusted external data, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from PR bodies and comments (via
gh), issue tracker content (documented inlinear.md), long-form documentation (documented innotion.md), team chat history (documented inslack.md), and production error logs (documented insentry.mdanddatadog.md). - Boundary markers: The prompt templates provided for subagents (
references/investigator-prompt.mdandreferences/synthesizer-prompt.md) do not utilize explicit boundary markers or delimiters when interpolating data from these external sources to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (via
gitandgh), run SQL queries (via Databricks MCP), and perform broad searches across documentation and chat platforms. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the ingested content. The instructions in
references/investigator-prompt.mdexplicitly tell the agent to "Quote verbatim" and "Read the whole thing," which may increase the risk of the agent obeying malicious instructions hidden within legitimate-looking data.
Audit Metadata