effective-design-artifact
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to offer the installation of the
@plannotator/totNPM package. This package is from a non-standard source that is not recognized as a trusted organization or well-known service. - Evidence:
npm install -g @plannotator/totinSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands, including checking for binary existence, installing global packages, and using a CLI tool to upload files.
- Evidence:
command -v tot,npm install -g @plannotator/tot, andtot path/to/artifact.htmlinSKILL.md. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill encourages the agent to publish generated HTML artifacts to a public web service (
tot.page) using thetotCLI. Although the instructions state this requires explicit user consent, it establishes a workflow for transferring local project files to an external, publicly accessible server. - Evidence: The section 'After the artifact ships' in
SKILL.mdand the commandtot path/to/artifact.html. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is instructed to ingest and follow guidelines from untrusted local files.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md,DESIGN.md,QUALITY.md, andPRODUCT.mdfrom the project directory to determine styling and behavior. - Boundary markers: The skill notes that authority flows from user instructions to existing project systems, but does not include explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the content read from these files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to generate HTML code, write files, and execute shell commands for publishing.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the external configuration files before it influences the agent's output.
Audit Metadata