hyperframes-pr-to-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub Pull Requests (title, body, comments, and diffs) which is used to generate video storyboards and scripts. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where a malicious PR author could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/fetch-pr.mjsretrieves PR data via the GitHub CLI;scripts/ingest.mjsprocesses this into avisible-text.txtbrief. - Boundary markers: The workflow lacks explicit boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when the agent interpolates the ingested text into its planning context.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including executing shell commands (
gh,ffmpeg,npx), writing to the local filesystem, and dispatching sub-agents to build HTML compositions. - Sanitization:
scripts/ingest.mjsprovides basic mitigation by stripping HTML comments from the PR body and enforcing character/line limits on the ingested content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several CLI tools and local Node.js scripts to automate the video creation process. These include the GitHub CLI for data fetching,
ffmpeg/ffprobefor audio processing, and thehyperframesCLI for project management and rendering. - Evidence:
scripts/fetch-pr.mjsusesexecFileSyncto rungh;scripts/assemble-index.mjsusesspawnSyncforffmpegandffprobe;scripts/audio.mjsspawns a sibling Node.js script to handle audio generation.
Audit Metadata