looper-pr-takeover
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch additional instructions and command references from a remote repository (
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nexu-io/looper/main/...). Since this source is not part of the established trusted organizations list, fetching and following these instructions is a security concern. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to read and act upon GitHub review threads and comments, which are untrusted external data sources. An attacker could post a review comment containing malicious instructions designed to trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
gh api graphqlto fetchreviewThreadsand comment bodies inSKILL.md(Step 1 of the Live loop). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the retrieved comment text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform code changes (
git commit), push code to remote branches (git push), dismiss reviews (gh api graphqlmutation), and merge pull requests (gh pr merge). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the comment content is performed before the agent interprets and acts upon the feedback.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on and executes the
looperCLI utility, which is a third-party tool not commonly found in standard operating environments. This represents a dependency on an external binary from an unverified vendor.
Audit Metadata