marketing-loops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from multiple external sources, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in external content could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from external news sites, social media platforms (X, Reddit, Hacker News), third-party review sites (G2, Capterra), and customer feedback channels (surveys, support tickets) as described in
references/loop-catalog.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit prompt-level delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat this external content as untrusted data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill orchestrates powerful tools including
social(for posting),emails(for sending messages),ads(for budget management), andrevops(for revenue operations), all of which could be target actions for an injection attack. - Sanitization: The skill relies on a 'two-tier action model' defined in
references/loop-guardrails.mdwhich mandates human review for all 'Tier 2' actions (spend, send, publish). While effective for preventing immediate harm, the agent's internal analysis and drafting (Tier 1) remain susceptible to influence. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes platform-specific commands to establish persistence and recurring execution.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to use scheduling primitives such asCronCreateandScheduleWakeupto automate loops. While these are legitimate platform features for the skill's stated purpose, they represent a mechanism for persistent execution on the host environment.
Audit Metadata