openclaw-agent-transcript
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/agent-transcriptexecutes thecodexcommand usingnode:child_process.spawnto communicate with a local application server for reading thread history. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local directories to retrieve session logs, including
~/.codex/sessions,~/.claude/projects,~/.pi/agent/sessions, and~/.openclaw/agents. It implements aredactfunction using regex to filter out private keys, API tokens, emails, and local paths before displaying or inserting the transcript. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes session logs which contain untrusted data from previous agent turns, creating a potential surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Local
.jsonlsession logs are read byscripts/agent-transcriptin thereadJsonlfunction and viaappServerThreadReadfor Codex threads. - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mdcontains explicit instructions for the agent to trim the transcript to relevant turns and drop system prompts or environment data before showing it to the user. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write local files and execute the
codexbinary viaspawn. - Sanitization: The script uses a multi-layered approach including regex-based redaction for PII and secrets, as well as an
unsafe()function that checks for residual sensitive patterns (likeBearertokens or session cookies) to block the output if detection fails.
Audit Metadata