openclaw-autoreview
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted code diffs and repository metadata to perform AI-powered reviews. This creates a surface where malicious code in the repository could attempt to influence the agent's review findings or behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads local work, committed branches, and PR candidates as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The
SKILL.mdfile contains explicit warnings that "Findings are advice to verify, not instructions to apply blindly." - Capability inventory: The skill interacts with the local file system and invokes external CLI tools such as
gitandtrufflehog(evidenced inscripts/autoreview_test.py). - Sanitization: A mandatory
TruffleHogscan is performed on all outgoing review data to prevent accidental leakage of secrets or sensitive data (documented inSKILL.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill and its accompanying test utilities execute shell commands to manage Git repositories and interface with AI service CLIs.
- Evidence:
scripts/test-review-harness.pyusessubprocess.runto initialize Git and execute the review script.tests/test_codex_sandbox.pyexecutes thecodex sandboxcommand to verify isolation. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The test suite utilizes dynamic module loading to verify the functionality of the main review script.
- Evidence:
scripts/autoreview_test.pyusesSourceFileLoaderandimportlib.utilto execute theautoreviewscript for testing purposes.
Audit Metadata