avatar-video
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text that serves as the script for AI avatar speech.
- Ingestion points: The
input_textfield inreferences/video-generation.mdandreferences/photo-avatars.mdis populated by external user scripts. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are shown in the example code snippets, although the data is transmitted within structured JSON payloads to the service provider.
- Capability inventory: The skill examples demonstrate network operations (HeyGen API) and local file reading via
fs.readFileSyncor Python'sopen(). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the user-provided script is documented in the integration examples.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation provides code to interact with external HeyGen API endpoints.
- Evidence: Requests are directed to
api.heygen.com,upload.heygen.com, andfiles.heygen.aifor legitimate functionality such as listing avatars, uploading media assets, and fetching generated video files. - Context: These domains belong to a well-known technology service for AI video production, and the usage pattern is consistent with standard API integration.
- [SAFE]: Manual review of the code snippets and instructional content shows no signs of malicious intent or security bypasses.
- Environment variables (
HEYGEN_API_KEY) are handled using best practices (process.envoros.environ) rather than being hardcoded. - The automated scanner flag is likely a false positive triggered by the high density of shell commands (
curl) and script examples within the documentation files.
Recommendations
- CRITICAL: 1 file(s) identified as malware by FileRep - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata