bfl-api
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The
authorfield in theSKILL.mdfrontmatter identifies the author as "Black Forest Labs," which contradicts the provided skill author information. While common for API wrappers, this mismatch is technically misleading. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data which could lead to indirect prompt injection if malicious content is embedded in inputs or API responses.
- Ingestion points: User-provided
promptstrings in generation requests andsampleURLs returned by the BFL API endpoints. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiter or instruction-guarding markers are implemented for the prompt inputs in the provided examples.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates network operations (via
curl,requests, andfetch) and file system writes (viacurl -oor language-specific file writing methods). - Sanitization: The Python and TypeScript clients include validation for image dimensions (multiples of 16, 4MP limit), but do not perform deep sanitization of the prompt strings or returned URLs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous shell commands for the agent to execute, including API requests and file downloads. These are directed at the official
api.bfl.aidomain and associated Azure storage for image delivery.
Audit Metadata