heygen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data, such as video scripts, appearance descriptions, and asset URLs, which are subsequently transmitted to the HeyGen API. This introduces a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection, where specially crafted inputs could be used to manipulate the generated content or the behavior of the agent during the process.
- Ingestion points: Input fields like
scriptinreferences/video-generation.md,appearanceinreferences/photo-avatars.md, andsourceUrlinreferences/assets.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or protective warnings for these inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables network communication with official vendor domains (
api.heygen.comandupload.heygen.com) to send data and retrieve generated assets. - Sanitization: The provided examples do not include logic for sanitizing or validating the contents of the user-provided text strings.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The integration guide for Remotion includes functionality to bundle and render local source code at runtime, which is a standard part of that specific workflow.
- Evidence:
references/remotion-integration.mddemonstrates using the@remotion/bundlerto process local source files (e.g.,./remotion/src/index.ts) for video composition. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation includes functions and instructions for downloading assets from arbitrary external URLs provided by the user to be used as backgrounds or audio inputs.
- Evidence:
references/assets.mddescribes auploadFromUrlworkflow that fetches binary data from user-supplied HTTPS URLs using thefetchAPI.
Audit Metadata