remotion-best-practices
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents patterns for fetching untrusted external data at runtime to calculate composition metadata, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Multiple files, including
rules/calculate-metadata.mdandrules/compositions.md, demonstrate fetching data from external URLs provided via props (e.g.,props.dataUrl,props.videoId). - Boundary markers: The provided code examples lack boundary markers or specific instructions to the agent to treat the fetched data as potentially untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill focuses on video rendering, but uses the
fetchAPI to retrieve remote content which is then used to dynamically set composition duration, dimensions, and other props. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is presented in the examples to ensure the integrity of the external data before it influences the agent's context or the rendering process.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for installing various third-party packages and tools required for the Remotion ecosystem.
- Evidence: The rule files frequently instruct the user to install packages like
@remotion/*,mapbox-gl,zod, and@turf/turf. Additionally,rules/transcribe-captions.mdprovides a script for installingwhisper.cpp. These are recognized as standard dependencies for the framework's features.
Audit Metadata