bmad-loop-setup
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads and installs the
bmad-looppackage directly from a Git repository (https://github.com/bmad-code-org/bmad-loop.git) usinguv tool install. This execution of code from an external, third-party source at runtime is a high-risk pattern. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches and installs software from a remote Git URL that is not part of a recognized trusted organization.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
uv runto execute a script located at{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_config.py. Executing scripts from the project's directory poses a risk as the content of the script could be maliciously modified or provided by an untrusted source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes multiple system commands including
uv tool install,uv tool upgrade,uv tool list, andbmad-loopsubcommands (init,validate,--version) to manage tool lifecycle and project state. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect instructions by ingesting configuration data from
./assets/module.yamland command-line arguments, and by relaying uncurated output from thebmad-loop initcommand back to the agent's context. - Ingestion points: Reads metadata from
assets/module.yamland accepts user-provided arguments. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings are used to separate untrusted data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: Includes remote package installation, local script execution, and filesystem modifications (
mkdir,cp). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the output of commands or values read from configuration files.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata