personal-crm

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from external connectors such as LinkedIn, email, and Slack to automate contact creation and profile enrichment. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content embedded in external messages or profiles could attempt to override the agent's instructions during the processing or logging phase.
  • Ingestion points: Data from third-party connectors (LinkedIn, email, Slack) and user-supplied notes about interactions are processed in SKILL.md under the 'Mode: Add new contact' and 'Mode: Log an interaction' sections.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when processing external content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file system read and write operations within the contacts/ directory.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation for the content pulled from external sources before it is interpreted by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 12:28 PM