skills/thecraighewitt/skills/shape/Gen Agent Trust Hub

shape

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the user and the local environment, which could potentially contain malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's logic during the PRD generation process.
  • Ingestion points: The skill captures a product idea directly from user input in Step 1 and reads various local files such as README.md, CLAUDE.md, and architecture documentation in Step 2.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to isolate the ingested data or to ignore any commands that might be embedded within the user idea or codebase files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read arbitrary project files, write new files to the ./prds/ directory, and execute the gh CLI to interact with GitHub.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization for the ingested content, although it instructions the agent to convert the user's idea into a kebab-case slug for use in titles and filenames.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the gh CLI to interact with a well-known service (GitHub).
  • The skill executes gh issue create --title "<slug>" --body-file ./prds/<slug>.md to push the generated PRD as a GitHub issue. This action is explicitly gated by a user confirmation prompt ([y/N]), providing a layer of manual oversight before the command is run.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 09:16 PM