godot-agent-vision
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands to perform screen captures and launch development tools. Evidence includes:
- Calling the
grimutility inscripts/capture.pyfor Wayland sessions. - Using
subprocess.Popeninscripts/stage_editor_bridge.pyto start the Godot editor with specific project paths. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic module loading and modifies project configuration files at runtime. Evidence includes:
- Using
__import__inscripts/capture.pyto load local dependency scripts (asset_sheet,ensure_gitignore,webp_encode) based on the file system layout. - Modifying the
project.godotfile inscripts/stage_editor_bridge.pyto enable a temporary editor plugin. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests visual data from the project, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are present in screenshots or assets.
- Ingestion points: Screenshots and assets are loaded via the Pillow library in
scripts/capture.pyandscripts/webp_encode.py. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded visual text are present in the review rubrics or instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write permissions and the ability to execute shell commands via
subprocessacross multiple scripts. - Sanitization: No visual sanitization or instruction filtering is performed on the visual content before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata