screenpipe
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from screen OCR and audio transcripts which are considered untrusted sources and may contain adversarial instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the search functionality in
screenpipe.mjswhich queries the Screenpipe local API. - Boundary markers: The script wraps search results in
<private>tags to prevent accidental storage by other tools, and instructions explicitly mandate treating the text as evidence rather than instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill is capable of executing local Node.js scripts, reading the
~/.claude-mem/settings.jsonfile, and making local HTTP requests to127.0.0.1orlocalhost. - Sanitization: Captured text is truncated to a maximum of 2,000 characters per record to limit the amount of external content processed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute a bundled Node.js helper script to interact with local services.
- The execution uses the
CLAUDE_SKILL_DIRenvironment variable to resolve the path to the script securely within the skill's directory. - The helper script strictly validates that all network endpoints are local HTTP origins, preventing the use of the tool for data exfiltration to remote servers.
Audit Metadata