weekly-digests
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic execution by instructing the agent to write a custom Python script (
.scratch/split-timeline.py) and then execute it to process timeline data. It also executes complex Node.js one-liners to resolve network ports dynamically from the filesystem. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive configuration data by reading
~/.claude-mem/settings.json. While used for local configuration, this pattern involves reading files outside the active project workspace. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of historical project data.
- Ingestion points: The
cm-timeline.mdfile (Step 2) contains the project's full history, includingS##lines which store raw, unescaped prompts from previous user sessions. - Boundary markers: Absent. The prompt template provides a format key but does not include instructions to treat historical session content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within those prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including shell command execution (
node,git,curl), local file system manipulation (mkdir,mv), and the ability to generate and run new Python scripts. - Sanitization: Absent. The data is read via
curland passed into a subagent pipeline without filtering or escaping potentially malicious payloads in the history.
Audit Metadata