weekly-digests

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic execution by instructing the agent to write a custom Python script (.scratch/split-timeline.py) and then execute it to process timeline data. It also executes complex Node.js one-liners to resolve network ports dynamically from the filesystem.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive configuration data by reading ~/.claude-mem/settings.json. While used for local configuration, this pattern involves reading files outside the active project workspace.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of historical project data.
  • Ingestion points: The cm-timeline.md file (Step 2) contains the project's full history, including S## lines which store raw, unescaped prompts from previous user sessions.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The prompt template provides a format key but does not include instructions to treat historical session content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within those prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including shell command execution (node, git, curl), local file system manipulation (mkdir, mv), and the ability to generate and run new Python scripts.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The data is read via curl and passed into a subagent pipeline without filtering or escaping potentially malicious payloads in the history.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 3, 2026, 01:58 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — weekly-digests