Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyuses monkeypatching to modify thepypdflibrary at runtime. It replaces thepypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod with a custom implementation to resolve a specific issue with selection list fields inpypdfversion 5.7.0. This represents a dynamic code modification of an external dependency. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF documents, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where document content could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: PDF documents are ingested and processed using
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpdf2image(inscripts/convert_pdf_to_images.py). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings are used to instruct the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the PDF content.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides scripts that can read from and write to the local file system.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the text or visual content extracted from PDFs before it is presented to the agent for analysis.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and scripts reference a large number of third-party libraries and system tools. These include Python packages such as
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pandas,pytesseract,pdf2image,pypdfium2,Pillow, andnumpy, as well as Node.js packages likepdf-libandpdfjs-dist. It also depends on command-line utilities includingqpdf,poppler-utils, andpdftk. While these are established tools, they represent a significant dependency footprint.
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