advanced-widgets
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements features that ingest untrusted external data, specifically an "AI Assistant" (MUI Premium) and "Excel-Style Clipboard" paste functionality. These components allow data from external sources (WebSocket streams, clipboard content) to be processed within the application context, creating a surface for potential instruction injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via WebSocket updates in
LiveDataGrid(SKILL.md), clipboard data in theDataGridPremiumpaste handler (SKILL.md), and browser local storage inGridWithProfiles(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The provided code snippets do not include explicit instructions, delimiters, or system prompt guardrails to prevent the AI assistant from interpreting data cell content as commands during data sampling.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides complex UI patterns for applications that typically possess
WriteandEditcapabilities, which could be targeted if an injection attack influences the agent's logic. - Sanitization: The implementation relies on standard React and MUI rendering. While this effectively mitigates traditional XSS, it does not address natural language prompt injection within the AI assistant's context.
Audit Metadata