skills/thelobbi/claude/kubernetes/Gen Agent Trust Hub

kubernetes

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from the Kubernetes cluster environment, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill utilizes kubectl logs, kubectl describe pod, and kubectl get events to retrieve information from the cluster (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potential malicious content within cluster outputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool and file system operations (Read, Write, Edit, Glob, Grep) as defined in the frontmatter.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the retrieved cluster data is implemented.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and examples for executing commands within the cluster environment.
  • Evidence: Documentation includes kubectl exec -it <pod> -n agents -- /bin/sh, which allows for interactive shell access to containers (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 13, 2026, 10:14 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — kubernetes