skills/thelobbi/claude/llmintegration/Gen Agent Trust Hub

llmintegration

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains multiple examples of prompt templates that interpolate untrusted external data (such as {user_input}, {code}, {problem}, and {auth_code}) directly into instructions for the LLM. This pattern is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions hidden in the data could override the agent's primary goals.
  • Ingestion points: Variable placeholders throughout SKILL.md used for processing user-supplied code, problems, and stories.
  • Boundary markers: The skill documentation suggests using XML tags (e.g., <user_story>, <codebase>) to provide structure, which helps the LLM distinguish data from instructions but does not guarantee prevention of injection attacks.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is designed for an environment where the agent has access to sensitive tools such as Bash, Write, and Edit, increasing the potential risk of a successful injection.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization logic within the provided code snippets to mitigate the risk of embedded commands in the interpolated variables.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 13, 2026, 10:14 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — llmintegration