virlo
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
virlo.shscript modifies shell startup files including~/.bashrc,~/.zshrc, and~/.bash_profileto persist theVIRLO_API_KEYenvironment variable. While this is presented as a setup convenience, modifying shell profiles is a persistence mechanism that changes the user's shell environment for future sessions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code execution by piping logic into
python3using both-ccommand-line arguments and shell heredocs. This is used for complex JSON manipulation, file editing, and scoring logic within thevirlo.shscript. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches content such as video descriptions and creator metadata from TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube via the
virlo.aiAPI. This external, untrusted data is returned to the agent and is intended for downstream analysis, presenting a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions could be embedded in the social media content. - Ingestion points: API responses fetched via the
videos,outliers, andadscommands inscripts/virlo.sh. - Boundary markers: None observed; content is processed and returned without explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory:
curl,jq,python3,sed,tail,mkdir,printf,uname,date,read(found inscripts/virlo.sh). - Sanitization: None observed; the script parses and filters the data but does not sanitize the text content for potential prompt instructions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata