repo-pitch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from untrusted external sources, which could potentially contain instructions intended to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: Content is read from local README files, GitHub descriptions (via the
ghCLI), and metadata from PyPI and npm registries. - Boundary markers: No explicit markers are used to delimit external content or instruct the agent to ignore embedded directives.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runto call theghCLI andurllib.request.urlopenfor network communication inscripts/pitch.py. - Sanitization: The
normalisefunction provides basic whitespace and case formatting but does not filter for potentially malicious semantic content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/pitch.pyexecutes thegh(GitHub CLI) tool to fetch repository information. - Evidence: The
github_descriptionfunction inscripts/pitch.pyinvokessubprocess.runwith theghcommand and user-provided repository arguments.
Audit Metadata