session-harvest
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-generated conversation transcripts from Claude Code's store to identify content worth persisting. This processing of untrusted data introduces a risk where malicious instructions within a transcript could influence the agent's behavior during the harvest procedure.
- Ingestion points: Reads Claude Code's transcripts and background-job state from
~/.claude(specifically referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill mentions using
tool-use idto match answers and turns, which helps in correctly attributing content within the transcript. - Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including writing to local repository files (
plans/*.md,AGENTS.md), executing system commands (git,gh,docker), and proposing the termination of processes. - Sanitization: The instructions state that commands should not be run through a shell, and results are primarily reported to stdout or written to specific local files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive system state auditing by executing commands such as
ps,ss,netstat,git,gh, anddocker. The underlying script (scripts/harvest.py) usessubprocess.runto facilitate these operations. While these are required for functionality, they represent a potential attack surface if command arguments are derived from unsanitized transcript content.
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