interrogate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted code diffs and file contents which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence or override the instructions of the LLM reviewers.
- Ingestion points: Code diffs (obtained via
git diff), file contents, commit messages, and PR descriptions are gathered in Step 1 ofSKILL.mdand passed to subagents. - Boundary markers: The prompt template in
references/reviewer-prompt.mduses placeholders like{DIFF_OR_FILES}to inject external data into the prompt without explicit structural delimiters or instructions to ignore commands embedded within that data. - Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands (
git diff) and spawns multiple subagents. The lead reviewer agent is responsible for synthesizing findings and is explicitly instructed not to auto-apply changes. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested content before it is processed by the subagent models.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to determine the scope of the review.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to rungit diff main...HEADto gather the changeset. This is a standard operation for development-oriented tools.
Audit Metadata