interrogate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted code diffs and file contents which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence or override the instructions of the LLM reviewers.
  • Ingestion points: Code diffs (obtained via git diff), file contents, commit messages, and PR descriptions are gathered in Step 1 of SKILL.md and passed to subagents.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt template in references/reviewer-prompt.md uses placeholders like {DIFF_OR_FILES} to inject external data into the prompt without explicit structural delimiters or instructions to ignore commands embedded within that data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands (git diff) and spawns multiple subagents. The lead reviewer agent is responsible for synthesizing findings and is explicitly instructed not to auto-apply changes.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested content before it is processed by the subagent models.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to determine the scope of the review.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md instructs the agent to run git diff main...HEAD to gather the changeset. This is a standard operation for development-oriented tools.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 06:20 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — interrogate