act
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from PR/MR thread comments and SAST tool annotations to automate code fixes and terminal command execution.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/pr-state.ts(fetches thread comments) andscripts/extract-findings.ts(extracts review comments and vulnerability findings). - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
write,edit, andexectools to modify project files and run build/test commands based on the external input. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted external content from the agent's internal reasoning, creating a surface for potential instruction override.
- Sanitization: Input content is used directly for analysis with minimal sanitization beyond length truncation for summaries.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary workflow relies on executing shell commands through
bun,node,gh, andglabto perform repository management and API interactions with GitHub and GitLab. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill provides scripts (
scripts/runner.cjs) to register and start a self-hosted GitHub Actions runner. This operation allows the execution of arbitrary code defined in repository workflows on the host machine. The skill's documentation identifies this as a security-sensitive operation and requires explicit user approval through themessage_usertool. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/runner.cjsscript downloads the official GitHub Actions runner binary from GitHub's repository. This download targets a well-known and trusted source for development infrastructure.
Audit Metadata