skills/theplenkov/skills/act/Gen Agent Trust Hub

act

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from PR/MR thread comments and SAST tool annotations to automate code fixes and terminal command execution.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/pr-state.ts (fetches thread comments) and scripts/extract-findings.ts (extracts review comments and vulnerability findings).
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes write, edit, and exec tools to modify project files and run build/test commands based on the external input.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted external content from the agent's internal reasoning, creating a surface for potential instruction override.
  • Sanitization: Input content is used directly for analysis with minimal sanitization beyond length truncation for summaries.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary workflow relies on executing shell commands through bun, node, gh, and glab to perform repository management and API interactions with GitHub and GitLab.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill provides scripts (scripts/runner.cjs) to register and start a self-hosted GitHub Actions runner. This operation allows the execution of arbitrary code defined in repository workflows on the host machine. The skill's documentation identifies this as a security-sensitive operation and requires explicit user approval through the message_user tool.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts/runner.cjs script downloads the official GitHub Actions runner binary from GitHub's repository. This download targets a well-known and trusted source for development infrastructure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 3, 2026, 02:53 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — act