media-tools
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive authentication credentials by reading and writing OAuth tokens to a hardcoded local path at
~/.codex/auth.json(shared with the Codex CLI) and resolving provider-specific API keys from environment variables and local.envfiles. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The implementation performs remote fetching of image content from external provider-generated URLs, as seen in the BytePlus and DashScope integration logic.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits user-supplied prompts and reference images to various third-party AI platforms including OpenRouter, Google Gemini, and OpenAI to perform its primary generation and analysis tasks.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input data (text prompts and image files) through external vision and generation models, presenting a surface for indirect prompt injection. * Ingestion points:
create_image.py(prompt input) andread_image.py(image file path). * Boundary markers: No explicit instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands in processed data. * Capability inventory: Network access via therequestslibrary and local file system write permissions. * Sanitization: Filename slugification is used for output management.
Audit Metadata