codex-delegate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the
codexCLI via a wrapper script (scripts/codex-session.sh) to perform implementation and auditing tasks. This enables the agent to execute complex, multi-turn logic outside of its own runtime environment. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill provides an interface to the
danger-full-accesssandbox mode in Codex. According to theREADME.mdandSKILL.md, this mode removes all sandboxing and approval requirements, effectively granting the subagent full system access. While the skill instructs the agent to obtain explicit user consent first, the presence of this capability increases the risk of privilege escalation if the agent is compromised or fails to follow safety protocols. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes project files by passing them to an external model (Codex) for analysis and editing.
- Ingestion points: File contents read by
codex execwithin the local workspace as documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not employ delimiters or specific instructions to help the subagent distinguish between its instructions and potentially malicious content embedded in the data (e.g., in code comments).
- Capability inventory: The subagent can write to the filesystem in
workspace-writemode and execute arbitrary system commands indanger-full-accessmode as seen inscripts/codex-session.sh. - Sanitization: Absent. Data from the filesystem is passed to the external model without filtering or sanitization.
Audit Metadata