codex-delegate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
codexCLI tool to perform tasks. The wrapper scriptscripts/codex-session.shusescodex execandcodex exec resumeto run arbitrary instructions provided as strings. While these are documented CLI features, they allow for substantial automated system interaction. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill supports the
danger-full-accesssandbox mode for the Codex CLI. As documented in the skill's ownREADME.mdandSKILL.md, this mode removes sandboxing and approvals, granting the external model full system access. Although it is labeled as a 'last resort' and requires user confirmation, the skill provides the functional path to bypass standard security boundaries. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a bridge between Claude and Codex. It is designed to ingest codebase data (files, project structure) and pass it to Codex. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in the codebase being analyzed could potentially influence the behavior of the Codex subagent, leading to unintended file edits or command execution.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdadvise the agent to rungit statusandgit diffto verify changes made by Codex. While this is a safety best practice for auditing, it confirms that the skill is intended to perform persistent, automated modifications to the local environment.
Audit Metadata