graphic-overlays
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow executes
npx hyperframes, which downloads and runs a CLI tool from the npm registry. This package originates from a non-trusted source and represents a third-party dependency executed at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of untrusted video transcripts. Malicious instructions embedded in the transcript could potentially influence the agent's card design process.
- Ingestion points: The
transcript.jsonfile, generated from user-provided audio, is used by the agent to design overlay cards (SKILL.md, Step 4 and 5). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the transcript data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
ffmpeg,ffprobe, and thehyperframesCLI, which executes generated HTML/JS in a headless browser. - Sanitization: The skill includes a 'Hard Rule' and linting process in Step 8 that prohibits
<script>tags and external URLs in the generated card HTML, reducing the risk of malicious script execution. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The agent dynamically generates HTML fragments and GSAP animation sequences based on the transcript content. This generated code is executed within a browser-based rendering engine to produce the final video output.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses system commands including
ffmpegandffprobeto process media files andnpxto manage and run the rendering toolchain.
Audit Metadata