retro

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the Bash tool to perform git operations (fetch, log, diff), manage local session files in ~/.gstack/, and interact with the gh and glab CLIs. It also modifies the CLAUDE.md file to inject routing rules.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In the preamble and several steps, the skill uses eval and shell sourcing (source <(...)) on the output of local binaries located in ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/ (e.g., gstack-slug, gstack-repo-mode). These binaries are provided by the skill vendor.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests data from external, untrusted sources.
  • Ingestion points: Reads git commit messages, PR/MR titles, CHANGELOG files, TODOS.md, and a user-authored retro-context.md file.
  • Boundary markers: None identified. The data is interpolated directly into the analysis narrative.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash (shell execution), Write (filesystem modification), and Read tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested git metadata before it is processed by the model for narrative generation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 26, 2026, 06:32 PM