retro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to perform git operations (fetch, log, diff), manage local session files in~/.gstack/, and interact with theghandglabCLIs. It also modifies theCLAUDE.mdfile to inject routing rules. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In the preamble and several steps, the skill uses
evaland shell sourcing (source <(...)) on the output of local binaries located in~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/(e.g.,gstack-slug,gstack-repo-mode). These binaries are provided by the skill vendor. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests data from external, untrusted sources.
- Ingestion points: Reads git commit messages, PR/MR titles,
CHANGELOGfiles,TODOS.md, and a user-authoredretro-context.mdfile. - Boundary markers: None identified. The data is interpolated directly into the analysis narrative.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash(shell execution),Write(filesystem modification), andReadtools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested git metadata before it is processed by the model for narrative generation.
Audit Metadata