forge-api
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Node.js script using the command
node ../../../.fullstack-forge/runtime/cli/src/composition-entry.js api compose --root <repository-root> --json. This command targets a script located three levels above the skill's directory, which involves executing arbitrary code on the host environment based on instructions within a markdown file. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a 'managed-adapter' pattern where it directs the agent to read its actual instructions ('canonical playbook') from an external path:
../../../.fullstack-forge/skills/forge-api/SKILL.md. This shifts the agent's logic to a file outside the skill's immediate package, creating a surface for instruction injection if the external file is modified. - Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read
SKILL.mdfrom a relative path and.forge/composition.json. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the external files.
- Capability inventory: The skill invokes a shell command (
node) to execute local files. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not perform validation or escaping of the paths or the output of the executed command.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata