forge-architecture
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Node.js script using a relative path:
node ../../../.fullstack-forge/runtime/cli/src/composition-entry.js. It also suggests running CLI commands likeforge doctorandforge update all, which implies the presence and execution of unverified local tooling. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative language to override the agent's current context, directing it to read and follow a "canonical playbook" located at a relative path (
../../../.fullstack-forge/skills/forge-architecture/SKILL.md) rather than the current file. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read content from
../../../.fullstack-forge/skills/forge-architecture/SKILL.mdand.forge/composition.json. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to delimit or sanitize the content retrieved from these external files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via Node.js and access the file system via relative paths.
- Sanitization: None detected for the external instructions or the JSON configuration data being processed.
Audit Metadata