forge-authorization
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Node.js script located at
../../../.fullstack-forge/runtime/cli/src/composition-entry.js. This uses relative path traversal to execute code from a location outside the skill's root directory. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to read and strictly follow instructions from a canonical playbook located at
../../../.fullstack-forge/skills/forge-authorization/SKILL.md. This bypasses skill isolation by loading instructions from the host file system. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to load ordered paths from a dynamically generated file
.forge/composition.jsonat runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface where it ingests instructions from external files (
SKILL.mdvia traversal and.forge/composition.json) and has command execution capabilities (node). It lacks sanitization, validation, or boundary markers to prevent malicious instructions in those external files from controlling the agent's behavior.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata