forge-cache
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute a specific Node.js command:
node ../../../.fullstack-forge/runtime/cli/src/composition-entry.js cache compose --root <repository-root> --json. This command executes a script file located at a relative path that escapes the skill's directory structure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to perform maintenance tasks using global command-line tools, specifically
forge doctorandforge update all, which grants the skill the ability to trigger broader system-level operations. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instruction to run a Node.js script from the path
../../../.fullstack-forge/runtime/cli/src/composition-entry.jsrepresents dynamic execution of code found in the host repository. This creates a risk where a malicious repository could provide a modified script to be executed by the agent. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a pointer that instructs the agent to ingest and follow instructions from
../../../.fullstack-forge/skills/forge-cache/SKILL.mdand.forge/composition.json. - Ingestion points: Files located at relative paths
../../../.fullstack-forge/skills/forge-cache/SKILL.mdand.forge/composition.jsonare added to the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious prompts within these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
node,forge). - Sanitization: No evidence of path validation or command argument sanitization is present in the adapter instructions.
Audit Metadata