forge-jobs

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a shell command: node ../../../.fullstack-forge/runtime/cli/src/composition-entry.js jobs compose --root <repository-root> --json. This involves executing a script from a relative path that reaches outside the skill's assumed directory structure, creating a risk if the target script is substituted or the path is manipulated.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By directing the agent to run composition-entry.js, the skill executes code not contained within its own package. This pattern of executing external logic from the filesystem is a significant security surface.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect prompt injection surface by loading specialist guidance from paths determined at runtime.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads .forge/composition.json to identify and load instruction files from the selected paths.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are provided.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to read local files, execute Node.js scripts, and follow instructions from dynamically identified paths.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the contents of the configuration file or the loaded instruction files is mentioned.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 6, 2026, 06:48 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — forge-jobs