run-event-production
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the official
ticketfairycommand-line tool to perform administrative tasks such as logging in, checking authentication status, and managing event data. These operations are performed with the user's permission and include safeguards like non-interactive mode requirements. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions direct the user to install the official Ticket Fairy CLI globally using
npm install -g ticketfairy. This is a vendor-provided tool hosted on a well-known public registry. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through attendee feedback comments, artist riders, tour books, email conversations, pasted spreadsheet rows, and various application forms (volunteers, traders, performers).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing this external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands via the
ticketfairyCLI, send emails/messages to attendees and staff, and modify event records in the database. - Sanitization: There is no explicit mention of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata