promote

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands like grep to search within memory files. These commands incorporate user-supplied <keywords> and <pattern> strings directly into the shell context, which can lead to command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill sources its instructions from MEMORY.md, which is a file populated with 'auto-memory' from past conversation history. This creates a vector where a malicious prompt provided in a previous session could be permanently promoted into the project's enforced rule system (CLAUDE.md).
  • Ingestion points: MEMORY.md is read using grep in Step 2 and Step 6.
  • Boundary markers: The workflow includes a manual confirmation step where the agent shows matching entries to the user before proceeding.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to read files (grep), write to project configuration (CLAUDE.md, .claude/rules/), and delete lines from memory files.
  • Sanitization: Step 4 defines a distillation process intended to transform descriptive notes into prescriptive rules, which provides a layer of manual/agent review.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill's primary function is to modify project-level and global rule files (CLAUDE.md). This enables the creation of persistent instructions that dictate agent behavior across all future sessions in that environment.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the ~/.claude/projects/ directory to read and modify MEMORY.md. This directory contains sensitive internal agent state, including project-specific history and automated notes that are not normally intended for direct external manipulation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 30, 2026, 03:48 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — promote