promote
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands like
grepto search within memory files. These commands incorporate user-supplied<keywords>and<pattern>strings directly into the shell context, which can lead to command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill sources its instructions from
MEMORY.md, which is a file populated with 'auto-memory' from past conversation history. This creates a vector where a malicious prompt provided in a previous session could be permanently promoted into the project's enforced rule system (CLAUDE.md). - Ingestion points:
MEMORY.mdis read usinggrepin Step 2 and Step 6. - Boundary markers: The workflow includes a manual confirmation step where the agent shows matching entries to the user before proceeding.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to read files (
grep), write to project configuration (CLAUDE.md,.claude/rules/), and delete lines from memory files. - Sanitization: Step 4 defines a distillation process intended to transform descriptive notes into prescriptive rules, which provides a layer of manual/agent review.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill's primary function is to modify project-level and global rule files (
CLAUDE.md). This enables the creation of persistent instructions that dictate agent behavior across all future sessions in that environment. - [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the
~/.claude/projects/directory to read and modifyMEMORY.md. This directory contains sensitive internal agent state, including project-specific history and automated notes that are not normally intended for direct external manipulation.
Audit Metadata