friction-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from user-specified artifacts and referenced files, passing it directly to multiple sub-agents for analysis.
- Ingestion points: Artifact content from the
$ARGUMENTSinput and recursively read referenced files (schema, service, config) as defined in Step 1 ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The sub-agent prompts in
SKILL.mdinterpolateARTIFACT_CONTENTdirectly without delimiters or explicit instructions for the agents to ignore embedded commands or instructions. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator is granted
BashandAgenttools. The sub-agents are prompted to useRead,Grep, andGlobtools. This combination allows for significant system interaction if an agent is successfully subverted. - Sanitization: None detected. The orchestrator is instructed to report findings verbatim from the sub-agents, meaning any malicious output generated by a compromised sub-agent would be presented to the user.
Audit Metadata